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Copy No. 10CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25 FEBRUARY 1954**COMMENT ON THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION**

Relinquishment of all offices by Egypt's President Mohammad Nagib on 24 February and assumption of leadership by Colonel Abdul Gamal Nasr formalize a de facto situation which has existed for several months. Nasr, a 36-year old pro-Western army officer, is now the dominant personality in the Revolutionary Command Council, which has ruled since the overthrow of King Farouk in July 1952.

This development is not likely to bring any immediate significant changes in internal affairs or in foreign policy, since Nasr has practically controlled both while the ill and discontented Nagib served as the popular figurehead.

Nasr has been involved in the day to day negotiations with Britain on the Suez issue. He believes that under him Egypt has already gone further in making concessions to Britain than any previous Egyptian government. He is not likely to make any more in the absence of new British moves. He will not necessarily be more difficult to deal with as initial reaction in London suggested. He may be expected to maintain internal order, preferring political and diplomatic measures, not guerrilla warfare, to bring about a Suez settlement.

In the past few weeks, the Egyptian government has given several indications of willingness to deal with the Soviet Union in an obvious effort to exert pressure on Britain and the United States; Nasr, however, has clearly shown opposition to developing close Egyptian-Soviet relations.

Under Nasr, Egypt may be expected to continue to develop reform programs, prosecute outstanding symbols of the corruption of the Farouk regime, push Egyptianization of the Sudan, and press for American military and economic aid.

Without Nagib's genial personality as a front, the military dictatorship may appear more starkly to be what it is. Little progress is likely to be made on a restoration of constitutional rule. The absence of Nagib may deprive the regime of considerable genuine popular support and necessitate greater reliance on police measures. Lacking a counterbalance, the basically inexperienced Nasr may become more arbitrary in his internal and external relations.

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